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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper follows the rise of the Internet drug sale industry and the response to the trend by 
regulators, policymakers, and private companies.  After discussing the existing laws and their 
enforcement to police rogue Internet pharmacies, the paper outlines in detail the 2008 Ryan 
Haight Act and its effect.  Finally, the paper analyzes two of the ongoing efforts to tighten the 
regulation of Internet pharmacies further.    3 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet evolved and pervaded the U.S., parts of the retail market adopted the new 
technology as an additional medium to reach consumers.  When prescription drugs began 
appearing for sale online, they became particularly popular because they were often cheaper 
(when sold from outside the U.S.) and easier to obtain (from online pharmacies that wrote 
prescriptions on the spot, based on a questionnaire). The proliferation of illegal sales of 
prescription drugs on the Internet has quickly created several challenges for policymakers, 
enforcement agencies, and consumers.  For prosecutors, the shift of the market to a new medium 
required the use of outdated laws to prosecute a new kind of illegal activity.  Policymakers have 
struggled with striking the right balance between expanding regulatory powers to encompass 
rogue Internet pharmacies, and leaving existing Internet speech freedoms intact.  Finally, rogue 
Internet pharmacies put the consumers at risk and saturate an online market with illegal activity.   
2) INTERNET PHARMACIES 
a.  Types of Internet pharmacies 
As other commentators observed, there are three categories of online pharmacies.
1  The main 
difference between the categories of pharmacies is the requirements they impose on a customer 
who wishes to purchase a prescription drug.  The first category comprises all online pharmacies 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Ludmila Bussiki Silva Clifton, Internet Drug Sales: Is It Time to Welcome “Big Brother” into Your 
Medicine Cabinet?, 20 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 541, 546 (2004); David L. Baumer, J.C. Poindexter, and Julie 
Earp, Can Regulation Of Distribution Of Pharmaceutical Products Coexist With Advances In Information 
Technology, 11 No. 2 J. Internet L. 1, 4 (2007).  5 
 
that comply with U.S. law, whereas the second and third categories are types of rogue online 
pharmacies.  
First are the legal pharmacies, which verify the existence of a valid prescription by calling the 
prescribing physician or accepting a copy of the prescription via mail or fax before selling a 
prescription drug. The websites of all mortar-and-brick pharmacies, such as CVS and Walgreens, 
fall into the first category of online pharmacies.  These pharmacies dispense only FDA-approved 
drugs, with proper labeling, in proper doses, and only upon a verification of a valid prescription.  
Legal pharmacies embody what the online market for medical drugs should look like, yet make 
up a mere 4% of all online pharmacies.
2  The other 96% of Internet pharmacies, which include 
the pharmacies discussed immediately below, are “rogue.” 
The second category of online pharmacies is questionnaire pharmacies.  These online pharmacies 
are often based in the U.S., and work with licensed physicians and pharmacists.
3  Questionnaire 
pharmacies have gradually formed around a perceived ambiguity of the statutory definition of a 
physician-patient relationship, and the definition of a valid medical prescription.  These 
pharmacies claim, whether of honest or of convenient belief, that a medical prescription may be 
issued by the pharmacy’s physician without an in-person consultation, based instead on a health 
questionnaire or a review of the customer’s medical history.  As discussed in part three, this 
                                                 
2 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy. Internet Drug Outlet Identification Program, April 2011, 
http://www.nabp.net/news/assets/IDOIReportApril11.pdf. 
3 See The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA), “You’ve Got Drugs! 
V: Prescription Drug Pushers on the Internet,” July 2008, www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/531-
2008%20You've%20Got%20Drugs%20V.pdf; see e.g. http://www.accessrx.com (domestic rogue online pharmacy 
offering prescription drugs based on an online questionnaire). 6 
 
perceived ambiguity in the law, resolved by federal legislation in 2008, has been perceived 
unambiguously illegal by nearly all states and the federal agencies all along.
4, 5 
Questionnaire pharmacies based outside the U.S. rely on another perceived legal loophole, based 
on the misinterpretation of FDA’s enforcement policy.  On its website, the FDA advises 
consumers that “it typically does not object to personal imports of drugs that FDA has not 
approved under certain circumstances,” including a situation where (1) the drug is for a serious 
condition, for which treatment is not available in the U.S., (2) the drug is not sold in the U.S., (3) 
the drug is considered not to represent an unreasonable risk, (4) the patient verifies in writing 
that the importation is for personal use only, and (5) the patient does not import more than three-
months’ worth of drugs.
6 Questionnaire pharmacies often interpret FDA’s enforcement policy as 
an endorsement of all import of drugs for personal use.
7  By maintaining semi-legitimacy, 
questionnaire pharmacies present a less appealing prosecution target, often staying active for 
years. 
                                                 
4 By 2006, over 40 states considered online questionnaire insufficient for a physician-patient relationship. See 
Federation of State Medical Boards, Internet Prescribing Language by State, September 2012, 
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/InternetPrescribing-law&policylanguage.pdf. 
5 See also Drug Enforcement Administration, Dispensing and Purchasing Controlled Substances Over the Internet, 
66 Fed. Reg. 82, 21181, 21883 (April 27, 2001) (Clarifying that “[c]ompleting a questionnaire that is then reviewed 
by a doctor hired by the Internet pharmacy could not be considered the basis for a doctor/patient relationship.”) 
6 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Is It Legal For Me to Personally Import Drugs? 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194904.htm. 
7 See e.g. http://www.canadadrugsonline.com/faq.aspx (citing the 90-day limitation but not the other parts of FDA’s 
enforcement policy). 7 
 
The third category of online pharmacies is the one that regulators find most troublesome: the 
“pill mill.” “Pill mills,” which outnumber the other types of online pharmacies,
8 do not pretend 
to know or comply with the laws of any country.  In fact, these pharmacies sometimes emphasize 
non-compliance with the law by disguising credit card transactions and packaging, and by openly 
advertising non-compliant features, such as selling prescription drugs and controlled substances 
without a valid prescription,
9 or providing discounts for bulk purchases of prescription drugs.
10  
Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Drug Enforcement Administration, Joseph Rannazzisi, 
summarizes the challenge of rogue pharmacies: 
[T]he  Internet  has  provided  drug  traffickin g  organizations  with  the  perfect 
medium.  It connects individuals from anywhere in the globe at any time; it 
provides anonymity; and it can be deployed from almost anywhere with very little 
formal training.  All of these features allow for a more rapid mea ns of diverting 
larger and larger quantities of controlled substances.  The proliferation of rogue 
Internet pharmacies has also brought new legal challenges.
11 
 
The business model of a “pill mill” is founded on anonymity.  The World Wide Web allows a 
Belgian operator to reside in Costa Rica, host websites on U.S. servers, maintain a call center in 
the Philippines, and sell to the U.S. market.
12  Worse yet, the website operator may have no 
                                                 
8 CASA supra, note 3. 
9 See e.g. http://www.cialiswithoutaprescription.com. 
10 See e.g. http://www.viagrabulk.com. 
11 Rogue Online Pharmacies: the Growing Problem of Internet Drug Trafficking: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007), (testimony of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110shrg43987/pdf/CHRG-110shrg43987.pdf.  
12 The example is not a hypothetical: SafeMedicines.org, Internet Pharmacy Owner Pleads Guilty To Selling Fake 
Drugs In US Court, January 2011, http://www.safemedicines.org/2011/01/Internet-pharmacy-owner-pleads-guilty-
to-selling-fake-drugs-in-us-court-134.html.  8 
 
permanent residence at all, and operate not one, but dozens of sites hosted in different countries.  
According to one study, 67% of non-VIPPS accredited online pharmacies use masked registrant 
service to conceal their actual location and contact details.
13  Many “pill mill” operators do not 
even bother to conceal their registration information, but register using fake identification 
instead.
14  
Experienced “pill mill” operators utilize sophisticated web-design techniques to build effective 
hierarchies to support their business.  At a given time, a “pill mill” operator may operate multiple 
advertising websites as well as sales websites.  An operator may set up an automatic 
“reincarnation” response in case a website is shut down by the domain name host, to upload 
another template of the website to a different location and update the links on its advertising 
websites.  For the user who enters ‘hydrocodone without prescription’ into the Google search 
engine, this switch in domain names would go unnoticed.  “Pill mill” operators also rely on 
advanced advertising techniques, such as search engine optimization
15 and Web 2.0
16 content.  A 
“pill mill” operator may spam blogs with links to his ‘pill mill,’ or incorporate popular drug 
                                                 
13 OpSec Security, Assessing the Risk of Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals in the Online Marketplace, 2009, available at 
http://www.securingpharma.com/agile_assets/79/OpSec_Study_Assessing_the_Risk_of_Counterfeit_Pharmaceutica
ls_in_the_Online_Marketplace_wcl.pdf. 
14 Id. 
15 Search engine optimization is the tweaking of a website to improve its search engine result rank for specific terms 
through the use of particular design and content. 
16 ‘Web 2.0’ is a term that describes websites where a significant portion of the content is submitted by users rather 
than the website operator, and includes many popular websites such as YouTube and Twitter. 9 
 
names in his site.  The operator may promote the “pill mill” directly on Facebook and Twitter,
17 
or promote an “educational” video about “online prescribing” on YouTube.
18 
Any effort to regulate Internet pharmacies must consider these three main segments of the 
market to be effective.  The proper measures to regulate the rare legitimate pharmacies differ 
from the measures necessary to highlight and eliminate “pill mills,” for instance. 
b.  Benefits 
There are several benefits to purchasing medicine online.  First, purchasing online is physically 
easier than going to the drugstore.  For the elderly—the age group that spends most on drugs
19—
the consideration is an important one.
20  Second, the Internet as a medium offers modern medical 
care tools such as email reminders, comprehensive information about medicines, and 24-hour 
assistance.  Third, online pharmacies allow patients to purchase drugs discreetly without a face-
to-face interaction.  Finally, the rise of online pharmacies creates more supply options for the 
patient to find the optimal service and price.
21 These benefits contributed to the growth of the 
legal Internet pharmacies.  
                                                 
17 The Partnership for Safe Medicines, Rogue Pharmacies Using Facebook To Hook Victims, May 2011, 
http://www.safemedicines.org/2011/05/rogue-pharmacies-using-facebook-to-hook-victims-235.html.  
18 See e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C50XXE8uuOk (a video titled “Tips for Buying Viagra Online 
Without Prescription”).  
19 Rand Corporation, Prescription Drugs and the Elderly: Policy Implications of Medicare Coverage, 1999, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB5028/index1.html. 
20 See Williams, On-Line Prescriptions and Drug Sales: An Overview of Emerging Issues, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & 
Policy 147 (2001). 
21 For example, http://www.pharmacychecker.com provides price comparisons for popular prescription drugs online. 10 
 
c.  Risks 
Online pharmacies also present several risks unique to the Internet medium.  One risk is that a 
patient may receive a prescription drug based on an online questionnaire instead of a valid 
prescription, and suffer serious side effects or dangerous drug interactions as a result.  This is the 
most common risk, as over 90% of online pharmacies do not require a valid prescription when 
selling prescription drugs
22 and over 95% lack appropriate licenses to sell prescription drugs in 
the countries to which they market their products.
23  Neither do online pharmacies attempt to 
mitigate the lack of a valid prescription by properly labeling the prescription medications – about 
50% of online drugs are delivered without any information for the patient.
24  Another risk is that 
a patient may receive counterfeit drugs that are sub- or super-potent, or that are adulterated.  
Counterfeit drugs are manufactured, packaged, and distributed without the regulatory oversight 
and control exercised over genuine drugs.  Counterfeit drugs have also become increasingly 
common worldwide, and now comprise 50% of all drugs sold online.
25  The third major risk of 
purchasing drugs from an online pharmacy is the misuse of patient medical, financial, and 
electronic information.  Because the operators of rogue online pharmacies maintain anonymity in 
                                                 
22 European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines, The Counterfeiting Superhighway, 2008, available at 
http://v35.pixelcms.com/ams/assets/312296678531/455_EAASM_counterfeiting%20report_020608.pdf.  
23 Id. at 20.  
24 Id. at 28.  
25 See World Health Organization, WHO and Partners Accelerate Fight Against Counterfeit Medicines, November 
2006, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr69/en/index.html.  11 
 
conducting business,
26 they may use the established veil to steal, sell, or otherwise abuse the 
medical and financial information entered by the patient.
27  
The Internet not only creates new risks, but also substantially exacerbates the existing diversion 
of controlled substances. In the words of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),  
[w]hile in-person ‘prescription mills’ (practitioners’ offices  that readily supply 
drug seekers with prescriptions for controlled substances without establishing a 
legitimate medical basis for doing so) have always been, and remain, a significant 
source of diversion, the advent of rogue Web sites that cater to those who abuse 
pharmaceutical controlled substances has allowed the criminal operators of these 
sites to exploit the anonymity of the Internet to generate illicit sales of controlled 
substances (and/or prescriptions therefor) that far exceed those of any in-person 
prescription mill.”
28   
 
One example of the Internet’s role in fueling the sales of controlled substances is the sales of 
hydrocodone, the most widely abused pharmaceutical controlled substance in the U.S.  
According to the DEA, in 2006, Internet pharmacies averaged 2.9 units sold per pharmacy, 
compared to 88,000 units per average U.S. pharmacy. 
29 
                                                 
26 LegitScript Blog, Industry Trends: EvaPharmacy, 33Drugs (DrugRevenue) emerge as major Internet threats, 
October 22, 2009, http://legitscriptblog.com/2009/10/industry-trends-evapharmacy-33drugs-drugrevenue-emerge-
as-major-Internet-threats/. 
27 For a full discussion on the risk that the rogue Internet pharmacies create for privacy see Jeff Karberg, Progress In 
the Challenge to Regulate Online Pharmacies, 23 J.L. & Health 113, 134-135 (2010).  
28 Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Implementation of the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy 
Consumer Protection Act of 2008; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 15596-15625, 15597 (April 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2009/fr0406.pdf.  
29 Id.  12 
 
3) CURRENT REGULATION 
As drug sales shifted to the Internet, private organizations, Internet intermediaries, states, and the 
federal government, all experimented in curtailing the illegal sales.  Over time, the coordination 
of efforts proved most effective.  
a.  Industry groups  
Pharmacies and their trade organizations have long sought to shield their market from rogue 
online pharmacies, protecting consumers in the process.  In 1999, the National Association of 
Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) developed the Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites (VIPPS) 
program “in order to provide a means for the public to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate online pharmacy practice sites.”
30  The program issues certifications to those online 
pharmacies that fulfill NABP’s criteria, and publishes the list of certified online pharmacies on 
its website.  The VIPPS criteria cover standards for licensure and policy maintenance, valid 
prescriptions, handling of patient information, communication with patients and professionals, 
storage and shipment of drugs, quality improvement programs, and reporting to NABP.
31  
Currently, there are 29 Internet pharmacies with VIPPS accreditation.
32 
The self-regulation by the passive accreditation system has been largely incapable of stopping 
the proliferation of rogue Internet pharmacies or effectively educating the public.  The VIPPS 
                                                 
30 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, VIPPS FAQs, 
http://www.nabp.net/programs/accreditation/vipps/vipps-faqs/.  
31 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, VIPPS Criteria, available at 
http://www.nabp.net/programs/accreditation/vipps/vipps-criteria/. 
32 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, Find a VIPPS Online Pharmacy, 
http://www.nabp.net/programs/accreditation/vipps/find-a-vipps-online-pharmacy/.  13 
 
website is helpful for consumers who already value safety above price and availability, and who 
are informed enough to find the VIPPS website first.  The average consumer may be tricked by a 
stolen VIPPS seal at a rogue online pharmacy website.  Moreover, consumers who are interested 
in a drug without prescription, or in a lower price for a drug manufactured elsewhere, are not 
affected by the VIPPS program.  
b.  Intermediaries 
Self-regulation by private companies extends beyond NABP, to the intermediaries who often 
profit from dealing with online pharmacies: financial intermediaries, search engines, advertising 
companies, domain name servers, and others.  Because of their broad reach and function, Internet 
intermediaries have always balanced their own interests with the interests of various nations, 
consumers, and businesses.  For the same reason, Internet intermediaries are targeted by both 
litigators and regulators.
33  After all, every rogue pharmacy must have a domain name, an IP 
address, a name server, a payment processor, and a delivery service.  Rogue pharmacies present 
a difficult dilemma for intermediaries, because rogue pharmacies are illegal in most, but not all, 
developed nations, and because rogue pharmacies are profitable partners.   
The self-regulation policies of Internet intermediaries are guided by two federal laws that affect 
the liability of intermediaries online: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
34 (DMCA) and the 
Communications Decency Act
35 (CDA).   
                                                 
33 See Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the 
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. Rev. 11, 16 (2006). 
34 Pub. L. 105-304 (1998).  
35 Pub. L. 104-104 (1996).  14 
 
Section 230 of the CDA
36 immunizes the providers of interactive computer services
37 from 
liability as speakers or publishers of information “provided by another information content 
provider.”
38  While a useful shield against tort claims, the CDA does not apply to criminal 
charges, intellectual property claims, or privacy laws.
39  In determining the application of the 
CDA’s immunity, courts ask whether (1) the defendant is a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service; (2) the defendant is being treated as the publisher or speaker for liability 
purposes; and (3) the challenged information is provided by another information content 
provider.
40  The CDA applies to relationships between certain Internet intermediaries and rogue 
pharmacies that cause private injury to users.  For example, if a user searches for a drug online 
using a search engine, clicks on one of the results, submits financial information, and then gets 
illegally charged by the rogue pharmacy, the CDA protects the search engine from fraud liability 
as a publisher.  The CDA avoids “chilling” communication transmitted by intermediaries, but 
does not provide an incentive for conduit intermediaries to monitor content. 
The DMCA establishes protections for online intermediaries from primary and secondary 
copyright liability. Section 512 of the Act
41 extends protection to intermediaries by type, while 
                                                 
36 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
37 The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
This includes online intermediaries, such as search engines and other user-based websites. See e.g. Fair Hous. 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (a website that facilitates 
user communication for matching roommates is an “interactive computer service” under the CDA).  
38 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).  
40 See e.g. word Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).  
41 17 U.S.C. § 512, also known as the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.  15 
 
attaching appropriate requirements for each type of intermediary.  The DMCA protects “passive” 
intermediaries, which transmit information automatically serving as a mere conduit, so long as 
the intermediary does not modify or cache the information.
42  Those intermediaries that 
temporarily cache the information for faster access are protected as well so long as they do not 
interfere with reasonable copy protection systems.
43  If the cached material is available to end 
users, the protection of the DMCA is available to the intermediary if the intermediary has 
established a process to expeditiously respond to copyright infringement claims.
44  Finally, those 
intermediaries that store (rather than temporarily cache) user material that is available to end 
users are eligible for the DMCA’s protection only if the satisfy three conditions: (1) the 
intermediary has no knowledge of the infringing material; (2) the intermediary does not receive a 
financial benefit from the infringing material; and (3) upon notification, the intermediary 
responds expeditiously to remove the infringing material.
45  In the context of rogue pharmacies, 
the DMCA provides protection from secondary copyright infringement to all “passive” 
intermediaries (e.g. Internet Service Providers), those cache-based intermediaries who comply 
with infringement requests (e.g. Domain Name Servers), and content-storing intermediaries that 
do not profit from infringing material, and remove the material upon notice (e.g. YouTube).  For 
example, if Google is sued for secondary copyright infringement based on one of the search 
results, Google may invoke the DMCA protections for cache-based intermediaries under Section 
512(b).
46  
                                                 
42 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).  
43 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1).  
44 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E).  
45 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).  
46 17 U.S.C. § 512(b). 16 
 
The effect of the CDA and the DMCA protections is evident among all major intermediaries. 
Content-based intermediaries have established procedures to address notices of illegal posts in 
order to qualify for the safe harbors under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
 .
47  On the other 
hand, most “passive” intermediaries exercise less gatekeeping for transmitting information.
48  
Generally, the private measures taken by online intermediaries incorporate the statutory 
safeguards, except where the intermediaries are explicitly avoiding U.S. regulation and 
enforcement.
49 
i.  Financial intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries are one of the crucial lifelines in Internet commerce for several reasons. 
First, financial institutions require non-anonymous contact, often including a physical address 
and a state-issued identification.  As a result, financial intermediaries carry higher responsibility 
for the actions of their users, allowing the intermediaries to impose their own conditions of use 
and reporting the identities of the users if needed.  Second, although the market for financial 
online intermediaries is active, a handful of companies dominate the vast majority of the market.  
Nearly every payment online will at some point rely on one of the few major credit card 
providers.  Finally, the major online financial intermediaries are not easily replaceable by rogue-
friendly alternatives.  Consumers may follow a link that does not look completely safe, but they 
                                                 
47 See e.g. Craigslist Terms of Use, http://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use; YouTube Community Guidelines, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines; Facebook, Report Abuse or Policy Violations, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=178608028874393&ref=hcnav. 
48 See e.g. Saul Hansell, Hollywood Wants Internet Providers to Block Copyrighted Files, New York Times, 
September 25, 2008.  
49 See e.g. LegitScript, Internet.bs: A Safe Haven for Drug-Related Cybercrime?, March 2012,  
http://www.legitscript.com/download/LegitScript_Report_on_Internet-bs_%28Large%29.pdf.  17 
 
are more hesitant to submit financial information to a fringe payment provider, whether a bank or 
a payment service.
50 
The major credit card companies have cooperated most actively in efforts to purge their client 
lists from rogue pharmacies.  The two major credit card companies, Visa and MasterCard, 
currently employ a screening policy for merchants and transactions to weed out merchants who 
use the payment systems for illegal sales of prescription drugs.
51  The companies developed their 
policies under the guidance of FDA and DEA in 2004-2005.  Both notified their member 
financial institutions regarding FDA’s standards for dispensing prescription drugs online.  In 
responding to the agencies’ rogue pharmacy leads in the past, the companies “worked to 
investigate these pharmacies and to terminate the acceptance of [the credit cards] for illicit 
activity.”
52   
Smaller financial intermediaries on the Internet do not cooperate as readily.  Internet “wallets,”
53 
payment service providers,
54 and other payment intermediaries often serve as added middlemen 
                                                 
50 For empirical research showing mistrust of online payments see MODASolutions, A Look At How Online Bill 
Payment Changes the eCommerce Landscape, September 2007, http://www.ebillme.com/pdfs/white-papers/ebillme-
online-bill-pay.pdf (citing Forrester Research, March 2005).  
51 Safety of Imported Pharmaceuticals: Strengthening Efforts to Combat the Sales of Controlled Substances over the 
Internet: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 109th Cong. 174-76 (2005) (statements of Mark MacCarthy, Senior Vice President, Public Policy, 
VISA, U.S.A., Inc. and Michael McEneney [for MasterCard], Partner, Sidley, Austin, Brown,& Wood, LLP). 
52 Id. (statement of Mark MacCarthy).  
53 An online wallet is a web service that allows users to store and control their financial information, such as a bank 
account number, shipping address and credit card details.  Popular ones include PayPal, Amazon Payments, and 
Yahoo! Wallet.  18 
 
for rogue pharmacies, providing additional anonymity for both the website operator and the 
customers.  Unlike the major credit card companies and banks, smaller financial intermediaries 
often form outside the U.S. and derive all of their business from e-commerce, where rogue 
pharmacies are both profitable and willing to pay higher fees.
55  In fact, several payment-
processing companies cater to rogue pharmacies by presenting themselves as an additional 
anonymity buffer in the payment chain.
56  The lower cooperation of smaller intermediaries may 
serve as a red flag in identifying rogue pharmacies. 
ii.  Search engines and advertising companies 
Internet search engines are the most commonly-used intermediaries online.  Google is not only 
the most popular online search engine but also the most visited website globally.
57  Unlike other 
intermediaries, search engines exercise little direct control over their content, leaving it instead to 
a complex computer algorithm, which sorts results by numerous factors, including hyperlinks 
                                                                                                                                                             
54 A payment service provider offers website operators online services for accepting electronic payments by a 
variety of payment methods, such as credit card and direct debit.  Advanced payment service providers provide full 
payment systems, including cash payments, prepaid cards or vouchers, and even paper or e-check processing. 
Popular payment service providers include PayPal, Authorize.net, and Moneybookers.   
55 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Champion Magazine, Internet Pharmacy: Gray Area 
With Big Profit And High Risks, December 2005, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01/87e08fff3788cc8585257108005f68f0?Open
Document.  
56 See e.g. http://www.offshorepaymentprocessing.com/FAQ.html (listing the following as ‘high risk merchants’ 
that would benefit from offshore payment processing: adult service providers, pharmaceutical merchants, terminated 
merchant file accounts). See also http://www.intabill.com/ (advertising for pharmaceuticals and gambling websites 
on the front page.) 
57 Alexa, Top Sites, http://www.alexa.com/topsites.  19 
 
between websites, overall popularity, and page-specific content.
58  Search engines add content to 
their vast databases through “web crawling” by Internet robots, followed by automatic indexing.   
Depending on the prompt, a search engine may provide a custom result that is not part of the 
computer algorithm.  For instance, Google may provide a direct (rather than hyperlinked) answer 
to the prompt “what is the weather in New York?”  In the context of medicines, where a prompt 
comprises the name of a medication, such as “Lipitor,” Google’s first result links to the drug’s 
page on the National Institutes of Health website.
59, 60  Beyond this tweak, search engines do not 
manually intervene with organic search results generated by the computer algorithm.
61  The lack 
of manual intervention is seen as crucial for the integrity of search engines; but it also makes 
filtering more difficult.  Operators of rogue pharmacies are unsurpassed in manipulating search 
engine results, which is why, for instance, the front page search results for “buy Lipitor” 
comprise nine online pharmacies, none of which is accredited by NABP or even the more lenient 
Legitscript.com.
62, 63 Despite this manipulation, the indexing process remains almost entirely 
                                                 
58 The Official Google Blog, Introduction to Google Ranking, July 2008, 
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automatic, keeping Google’s monitoring a step behind; and the incentives to monitor more 
strictly are diminished by the CDA’s immunity provision.   
Search engines exercise more control when they act as advertisers, displaying relevant ads 
whenever a purchased “ad-word” is in the search prompt.  Each major search engine features a 
detailed policy for advertising, restricting the advertising of several products, such as alcohol, 
casinos, drugs, and weapons.
64  In their role as advertisers, search engines collect millions of 
dollars in revenue, proportionally tied to the traffic that the ads generate for rogue Internet 
pharmacies.
65   
When the CDA was passed, it was not entirely clear whether the advertising services offered by 
search engines qualify for the immunity provisions.  The question hinged on whether, when 
acting as advertisers, search engines contribute to user-submitted information, and thus become 
information content providers under Section 230.  To purchase an ad through Google, a company 
buys certain keywords that will trigger the appearance of the ad.  Google provides the company a 
keyword suggestion tool to identify possible keywords, based on search data.  Other major 
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and www.buckadaypharmacy.com.  
63 Another example is the Google search for “Viagra,” which returns www.cheapviagraonline.com as one of the 
front page results.  The website consists of one line of text (linking to another rogue pharmacy) on a white 
background.  That the single line of text came ahead of numerous legitimate major pharmacies that legally sell 
Viagra attests to the skill of the website operator in manipulating search results.  
64 See e.g. Google Advertising Policies. 
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search engines implement similar systems.  In Goddard v. Google, Inc.,
66 the court concluded 
that CDA’s immunization does apply to Google in its role as an advertising service, because the 
service was a mere framework that could be used for both legal and illegal purposes.  The 
Goddard reasoning built on the analysis of Carafano v. Metrosplash,
67 which granted CDA 
immunity to a dating website.  Carafano established that a tool facilitating the expression of 
information is considered “neutral” so long as users ultimately determine what content to post.
68  
As a result, at least in California, search engines do enjoy CDA liability protection when acting 
as advertisers. 
Yet, the role of search engines as advertisers in facilitating rogue pharmacy traffic was 
untenable: the popular search engines are major U.S. corporations long subject to U.S. laws, and 
responsible for the vast majority of online traffic.
69  Moreover, while the CDA protects search 
engines against some claims, the Act does shield the companies from criminal prosecution.  
After pressure from policymakers, all three major search engines—Google, Yahoo!, and Bing—
began limiting accepted pharmacy ads to those certified by PharmacyChecker, an independent 
evaluator of online pharmacies.
70, 71  However, an investigation by the FDA in 2009 revealed that 
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the self-regulation was insufficient on both ends – rogue pharmacies slipped through the cracks 
of both Google AdWords and PharmacyChecker (www.pharmacychecker.com).
72  Scrambling to 
tighten its admission criteria, Google agreed to settle the investigation for $500 million, and 
sacked PharmacyChecker for NABP’s VIPPS.
73  Microsoft Bing and Yahoo! followed suit.
74  
The Department of Justice later revealed that the prosecution against Google’s AdWords was 
built around the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act, both of which 
provide criminal penalties for offenders.
75  
Google’s failure to keep rogue pharmacies off its advertising client list—whether through 
incompetence or convenience—raises the question of the necessary government regulation in the 
area.  Although the VIPPS is unlikely to lose its “gold standard” criteria for admission, Google’s 
semi-automatic AdWords system has allowed the participation of uncertified rogue pharmacies 
in the past.  The $500 million paid to settle the investigation is insubstantial considering the $1 
billion-a-year revenues from online pharmacy ads.
76  Taken together, the profitability of 
AdWords advertising, the control that search engines have exercised over advertising, and the 
search engines’ patchy past in self-regulation of advertising led some commentators to call for 
increased regulation of search engines’ advertising services.
77   
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iii.  Domain name registrars 
Despite the appearance of anarchy, the Internet maintains a system of rules developed by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  ICANN is responsible for 
accrediting domain name registrars, the companies that lend Internet addresses to website 
operators for a fee.
78  The Registrar Accreditation Agreement requires all registrars to prohibit 
website owners from using the registrar’s leased domain names for unlawful purposes.
79  Yet, 
registrars have historically been slow and reluctant to ban and purge rogue online pharmacies.  
The main reasons behind lack of self-regulation is the loose registration process, which facilitates 
anonymity for website operators; and the ephemeral nature of rogue pharmacies, which makes 
the ever-emerging pharmacies a lucrative business.  
Domain name registrars’ ability to regulate clients is handicapped by the WhoIs registration 
system for the purchasers of domain names.  The registration process accepts the website 
operator’s data on an honor system, without requiring proof or validation.  Unsurprisingly, a U.S. 
GAO report found that nearly 9% of all websites were registered with blatantly false or missing 
WhoIs data, such as “qwerty” for name and “123456789” for a phone number.
80  The 9% 
comprise the lazy website operators; it is unclear how many operators enter false data that looks 
a little more realistic.  In addition to neglecting to validate registration data, registrars offer 
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website operators the option of hiding the WhoIs data from the public entirely for $10 a year.
81 
The option hides the identity of the operator from the public.  
Besides a loose registration process and the sale of additional anonymity, many domain name 
registrars welcome rogue pharmacies and refuse to shut them down even upon a notice of the 
unlawful activity.  In a study by the Internet compliance group Knujon, eleven out of sixteen 
registrars acted to shut down rogue pharmacies on their domains, while the other five refused to 
cooperate.
82  In response to evidence that the pharmacy certificates on the rogue websites were 
fake, the five registrars claimed that their responsibility as registrars does not extend to policing 
the operators that use their services.
83  Recognizing the role of registrars in the facilitation of 
unlawful pharmaceutical sales, the NABP has issued a letter to registrars, requesting the 
termination of all rogue pharmacies (pharmacies that are not approved by LegitScript), pursuant 
to ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy signed by each registrar.
84  
Pressure by Knujon and CastleCops finally persuaded ICANN to exercise its authority and shut 
down one of the offending registrars (the owner of which was convicted of credit card fraud, 
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money laundering, and document forgery in Estonia).
85  The decision to terminate the registrar 
resulted in the diaspora of hundreds of thousands of websites, both legitimate and unlawful.
86 
In sum, domain name registrars provide minimal self-regulation against rogue pharmacies.  
ICANN largely held back its authority to terminate whole registrars, as the shotgun measure 
often hurts legal websites more than unlawful ones.  The lack of cases concerning prosecution of 
domain name registrars for refusing to monitor their clientele indicates one of two conclusions: 
either regulators are hesitant to prosecute registrars given the existing scant law, or the registrars 
are more compliant with regulators than with private organizations, or both.  Either way, the 
structure of domain name registrars suggests that these intermediaries, while necessary for 
Internet pharmacies (and all other websites), are too blunt of a regulatory target.  
iv.  Other intermediaries 
Several major websites, such as eBay, Amazon, Craigslist, YouTube, and Facebook, rely on 
user-generated input, leaving an open door for user-generated advertising of rogue 
pharmaceutical websites.  These other website intermediaries comprise mainstream websites 
(e.g. YouTube) and fringe websites (e.g. forums on importing medicine).  The mainstream 
intermediaries offer wide exposure whereas the fringe websites are better at attracting and 
“converting” repeat visitors.
87  The mainstream content-based intermediaries have all established 
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procedures to address notices of illegal posts in order to qualify for the safe harbors under the 
DMCA and the CDA.
88   However, fringe intermediaries, such as forums and ad-sites
89 are more 
fragmented and less compliant.  A typical search for a prescription medicine returns several ad-
sites whose sole purpose is to bridge the user to a rogue pharmacy.  Although these fringe 
intermediaries generate little traffic on their own, they are potent tools at evading the filters of 
other larger intermediaries to reach the Internet users.  Besides avoiding self-regulation, fringe 
intermediaries also pose regulatory challenges to the U.S. agencies.  
c.  States 
The regulation of pharmacies and physicians traditionally belongs to the states.  State laws limit 
dispensing of prescription drug to (1) licensed pharmacists working in (2) licensed pharmacies, 
and only upon the presentation of a (3) valid prescription from a (4) licensed health care 
professional.
90  State boards of pharmacy establish and enforce the operation standards for 
pharmacies within each state.  State boards of pharmacy also issue licenses to pharmacies and 
pharmacists, and most issue licenses to out-of-state pharmacies that sell drugs to residents of the 
state.  Conversely, state medical boards license health care professionals and outline the practice 
of medicine standards, including the requirements for a valid prescription.  The regulation by the 
two types of boards is integrated with state law.  For instance, in a number of states, medical 
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boards define invalid prescribing as “unprofessional conduct,” and state laws allow penalties for 
physicians who engage in unprofessional conduct.
91 The state or the professional boards may 
take action against a pharmacy, a pharmacist, or a health care professional, based on the violation 
of any of the four criteria for prescribing medications.  In the context of online pharmacies, the 
relevant state requirement is the issuance and acceptance of a valid prescription.   
Initially, states relied on the existing licensing and consumer protection regulations.
92  The first 
multi-state response was the creation of the Online Pharmacy Working Group by the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), to share information on rogue online pharmacies.
93  
As the number of rogue online pharmacies continued to grow, many states passed policy 
statements or interpretations, to clarify that state laws apply to online pharmacies as well.
94  
Several states have passed laws to ban online prescription, some by listing in-person evaluation 
as a requirement for a valid prescription, while others by explicitly banning prescriptions by 
Internet.
95  Today, only five states do not address Internet prescribing through regulation.
96  Most 
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of the regulations are promulgated by the boards of medicine, and range from direct regulation of 
Internet prescriptions
97 to general requirements that the physician examine the patient for a 
prescription to be considered valid.
98 The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), a 
nonprofit organization providing guidance to state boards of pharmacy and medical boards, took 
the early position that “[t]reatment, including issuing a prescription, based solely on an online 
questionnaire or consultation does not constitute an acceptable standard of care.”
99  The 
American Medical Association adopted a similar policy, finding Internet prescribing “below a 
minimum standard of medical care.”
100  States have also begun enforcing their licensing 
privileges by prohibiting the sales of pharmaceuticals into the state by unlicensed online 
pharmacies.
101    
Despite the promulgation of new laws, their enforcement against most Internet pharmacies, and 
especially “pill mills,” has been a difficult challenge for the states.  State boards of pharmacy and 
medicine struggle to identify pharmacy owners and prescribing physicians, and to dedicate 
sufficient resources to prosecute violators.
102  As with online gambling and copyright violations, 
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the global nature of the Internet often does not lend itself to effective regulation by the states.    
The NAAG recognized the limitations of the states in dealing with Internet pharmacies when the 
organization formally requested for federal legislation that would grant the states the power to 
seek nation-wide injunctive relief against rogue Internet pharmacies.
103  The states are best 
situated to investigate diversion once it occurs in their borders, but not to prevent it on the World 
Wide Web.  
d.  Federal 
On the federal level, the introduction of drugs into interstate commerce is subject to the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), enforced by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
Drugs classified as controlled substances are also subject to the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA), enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  Where Internet pharmacies 
engage in “deceptive or unfair practices in commerce,” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
assisted FDA investigations under the Federal Trade Commission Act.  However, the FTC 
considers the regulation of Internet pharmacies to be mainly the responsibility of the FDA.
104   
i.  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
The FDCA prohibits the “introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of 
any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.”
105  Generally, the FDCA defines drugs 
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‘adulterated’ if their manufacture is non-compliant with published manufacturing practices or if 
their composition differs from the published standard or is unsafe.
106  The FDCA defines drugs 
‘misbranded’ if their labeling is false or misleading, or lacks any of the information that the 
FDCA requires to be placed on the label.
107  Finally, the FDCA prohibits the dispensation of a 
prescription drug under the FDCA, except upon a written prescription by a licensed 
practitioner.
108  
Several cases discuss the definition of a “valid prescription” under the FDCA.  The Supreme 
Court first discussed the definition of a prescription in the context of the Harrison Narcotic Act 
of 1914, ruling that (1) a prescription may only be issued for legitimate medical purposes 
pursuant to a valid doctor-patient relationship;
109 and (2) the issuance of prescription without a 
doctor-patient relationship violates the “professional practice” standard.
110  Later Circuit Court 
opinions adopted the Supreme Court’s view of the definition in the Harrison Narcotic Act to 
interpret the prescription requirement in the FDCA.
111  Today, the case law requires the 
following for a valid prescription: a sufficient medical examination and consideration of the 
patient’s individual needs, a valid doctor-patient relationship, and a good faith determination that 
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the medication is medically necessary.
112  An example of the modern standard as applied to 
online prescribing is the Third Circuit case U.S. v. Nelson.
113  There, the court concluded that 
prescribing online without a medical examination was both “without legitimate medical purpose” 
and outside of “the usual course of medicine.”
114, 115  Although the case law is helpful in 
prosecuting some offending websites, not all Circuit Courts had chance to interpret the 
prescription requirement in the context of Internet prescriptions, making it burdensome for the 
FDA to initiate cases relying on the prescription requirement alone.  
Since the emergence of the first Internet pharmacies, the FDA has relied on the FDCA’s core 
provisions to investigate and prosecute Internet pharmacies that mislabel drugs, sell counterfeit 
or foreign-market drugs, or issue their own online prescription.
116  Beginning in 1996, the agency 
began coordinating its activities with a coalition of trade groups, including FSMB, NAAG, and 
AMA.
117  The FDA prioritized its efforts based on public risk, focusing foremost on unapproved 
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new drugs, but also health fraud and prescription drugs dispensed without a valid prescription.
118  
The agency also improved its data acquisition from the Internet, coordinated case assessment 
between the FDA Centers, and enhanced enforcement resources.
119  By 2000, the FDA issued 23 
warning letters to rogue Internet pharmacies based domestically and thirteen “cyber” letters to 
those based abroad, imposed an injunction against the sale of a thyroid-based weight-loss drug, 
and issued fourteen import alerts.
120  In 2004, the FDA relied on the cooperation of U.S.-based 
Internet service providers (ISPs) to shut down four foreign Internet pharmacies dealing 
counterfeit contraceptives.
121  The agency also successfully prosecuted several rogue pharmacies 
located within the U.S., charging the operators with conspiracies to violate the FDCA, money 
laundering, mail fraud, dispensing misbranded drugs, and operating unregistered drug 
facilities.
122   
The growing prevalence of rogue Internet pharmacies
123 puts in question the sufficiency of the 
FDA’s efforts.  The agency has to rely on substantial voluntary cooperation of ISPs, search 
engines, other agencies, and foreign governments to shut down foreign-based rogue pharmacies.  
Recognizing its limitations, the FDA asked Congress to mandate a federal license for Internet 
pharmacies, similar to the licenses of brick-and-mortar pharmacies, and require each Internet 
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pharmacy to display its contact information on its website.
124  Such a proposal would maintain 
the states’ authority over the practice of medicine and pharmacy, and require minimal federal 
legislation.  Today, the proposal is still circulating in the U.S. Senate,
 125 and the FDA is still 
employing its traditional authority to prosecute both rogue Internet pharmacies and 
intermediaries.
126 
ii.  The Controlled Substances Act 
When Internet pharmacies sell controlled substances they become subject to the Controlled 
Substances Act, which defines certain drugs as “controlled substances” and lists them within one 
of five established schedules, depending on potential for abuse and accepted medical use.
127  The 
CSA makes it unlawful for any person to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,”
128 allowing an exception 
to those who register with the Attorney General in accordance with the agency’s regulations.
129  
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The CSA requires a written or oral prescription for all drugs that are determined prescription 
drugs by the FDA.
130 
Prior to 2008, the DEA relied on the CSA’s core provisions to trace and prosecute rogue Internet 
pharmacy operators.  The agency examined the electronic filings of distributors and 
manufacturers to identify those pharmacies that prescribe unusually high proportion of controlled 
substances.
131  Because Internet pharmacies churn out many more prescriptions than brick-and-
mortar pharmacies do, and because 95% of these prescriptions are for controlled substances, the 
DEA’s high-volume leads often led to rogue Internet pharmacies.
132  Additionally, the agency’s 
investigation of narcotics trafficking uncovered links to rogue Internet pharmacies as well.
133   
The DEA also began cooperation with intermediaries and other agencies, similarly to the FDA’s 
early efforts, aiming to use the cumulative intelligence to improve monitoring and 
enforcement.
134  Specifically, the agency conducted several education sessions for wholesale 
distributors to combat diversion, and established the Internet Industry Initiative “to exploit the 
weaknesses inherent to the schemes used by Internet traffickers who rely extensively on the 
commercial services of [. . .] Internet service providers, [delivery] companies, and financial 
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service companies.
135  Finally, the DEA formed a specialized section within its Special 
Operations Division, which began investigating multi-jurisdiction Internet pharmacies, beginning 
in 2004.
136  The section actively coordinates Internet investigations to capture perpetrators and 
controlled substances.    
Yet, the enforcement of the CSA to shut down rogue Internet pharmacies remained a challenge 
for the DEA, due to limited jurisdiction, the slow pace of litigation compared to online 
commerce, and merely case law as authority against questionnaire pharmacies.
137  In the height 
of the advocacy campaign for additional federal legislation, President George W. Bush called on 
Congress to enact legislation to facilitate the regulation of rogue Internet pharmacies.
138  Later 
that year, Congress acquiesced.  
4) MOST RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION: THE RYAN 
HAIGHT ACT 
In 2008 Congress expanded CSA to address Internet pharmacies directly by passing the Ryan 
Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act (Ryan Haight Act or RHA).
139  In its key 
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provisions, the RHA requires that each online pharmacy register with the DEA for an approval to 
sell controlled substances online;
140 and prohibits prescribing over the Internet, unless a 
physician has conducted an in-person examination of the patient.
141  The Act takes the 
opportunity to finally define the term ‘valid prescription’ in a federal statute, as “a prescription 
that is issued for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice by [. . 
.] a practitioner who has conducted at least 1 in-person medical evaluation of the patient.”
142  The 
RHA also adopts FDA’s earlier proposal and requires each online pharmacy to post its contact 
and registration information on the pharmacy’s homepage.
143 
In addition to creating explicit legal requirements for online pharmacies, RHA facilitates 
prosecution and deterrence by (1) increasing the penalties for distributing certain drugs;
144 (2) 
requiring each online pharmacy to report its dispensing volume to the U.S. Attorney General 
when the pharmacy dispenses over 5,000 dosage units monthly;
145 (3) prohibiting advertising or 
aiding illegal online sales of controlled substances;
146 and (4) creating a civil cause of action and 
an injunctive relief for state attorneys general.
147  These provisions indicate an understanding that 
legal requirements alone are insufficient in shutting down savvy “pill mills.” 
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a.  The in-person examination requirement for a valid prescription 
The RHA’s requirement that a valid prescription must be based on an in-person medical 
evaluation is not entirely new: prior to the enactment of the Act, the CSA listed in-person 
examination as one of the four recommended criteria in determining the existence of a physician-
patient relationship.
148  The DEA has long established that a controlled substance may be 
prescribed only “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice.”
149  Although the terms “legitimate medical purpose” and 
“usual course of professional practice” are not defined in the statute, courts interpreted the term 
“professional practice” to refer to accepted medical practice, which requires a physician-patient 
relationship.
150  The DEA further clarified in its 2001 guidance that completing a questionnaire 
online is “unlikely” to form a doctor-patient,
151 and is thus usually insufficient for a valid 
prescription.  The RHA takes the extra step to remove all doubt that a mere in-person 
examination is insufficient for a physician-patient relationship under federal law.  Now federal 
prosecutor no longer have to rely on juries to determine whether an Internet interaction 
establishes a physician-patient relationship.  
The significance of the new in-person medical examination is best illustrated in the case of 
Orlando Birbragher.
152  Birbragher operated a questionnaire pharmacy (“Pharmacom”) to sell 
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Schedule III and IV controlled substances to customers based on an online health history 
questionnaire.  Pharmacom contracted with physicians to review the questionnaires, and with 
pharmacies to fill the orders based on the physicians’ “prescriptions.”  On November 7, 2007, 
after generating over $40 million in sales, Birbragher and other co-defendants were charged in a 
31-count indictment.  The main drug conspiracy charge was dispensing Schedule III and IV 
controlled substances outside of the usual course of professional practice and without a 
legitimate medical purpose, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
153 and § 841(b)(1)(d).
154  
Birbragher asserted two arguments in his defense: (1) that in 2003, when the alleged conspiracy 
began, CSA was unclear regarding the legality of the manner in which he dispensed controlled 
substances; and (2) that the fact that Congress passed the RHA establishes CSA’s ambiguity 
concerning online questionnaires prior to the RHA.
155  
In rejecting Birbragher’s vagueness arguments, the Eighth Circuit noted that “Birbragher has not 
cited any authority, and [the Court found] none, that either the CSA or 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04
156 
fails to provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited.”
157  The Court agreed with the 
U.S. Court for the East District of New York that “the government is obliged to prove, and the 
jury constrained to determine, what the medical profession would generally do in the 
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circumstances.”
158  In Birbragher’s case, the defendant did not give physical examinations (or 
ignored the results when he did), gave methadone outside of a clinic and without precautions 
against misuse, and did not regulate the dosage of the prescribed substances.
159  Upon these jury 
findings, it is unsurprising that the jury then concluded that Birbragher acted outside the usual 
course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. 
The enactment of the RHA eliminates the government’s dependence on the jury to determine that 
a prescription without an in-person examination falls outside professional medical practice.  
After all, Birbragher’s behavior was an egregious example of a physician acting as a “pusher.”
160  
Had Birbragher limited the dispensed doses and required clients to electronically sign a note 
promising that the drugs will only be used for legitimate purposes, the case would have been 
more difficult for the prosecution.  The RHA allows prosecutors to use in-person examination as 
a sufficient indication of conduct that is outside the usual course of professional practice.  The 
federal scope of the RHA also prevents website operators from moving to another state and 
continuing their illegal activity until the next state lawsuit.  
b.  The registration requirement 
The RHA’s registration requirement is not entirely new to online pharmacies either.  In its 2001 
regulations, the DEA confirmed that an online pharmacy that sells controlled substances to the 
U.S. must register its physical location with the DEA.
161  Moreover, by 2008, when Congress 
passed the RHA, at least 40 state pharmacy boards licensed or registered all out-of-state 
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pharmacies that provide services to residents in their respective states.
162  Building on the 
existing federal regulations, the RHA requires online pharmacies to obtain a special registration 
modification from the DEA to operate legally.
163  The RHA registration requirement arms the 
federal agencies with an efficient identification and prosecution tool for rogue online 
pharmacies: any online pharmacy that sells to U.S. customers without the explicit approval of the 
DEA violates the CSA.  Because the RHA requires the display of contact information on each 
pharmacy’s homepage, prosecutors can quickly ascertain whether a pharmacy is registered with 
the DEA.   
c.  Regulating intermediaries 
The RHA prohibits to “knowingly or intentionally [. . .] aid or abet” the delivery, distribution, or 
dispensing of controlled substances via the Internet.
164  The Act provides the following example 
as aiding under the RHA: “serving as an agent, intermediary, or other entity that causes the 
Internet to be used to bring together a buyer and seller to engage in the dispensing of a controlled 
substance in [an unauthorized manner].”
165  The DEA’s promulgated regulations note that the 
provision is “aimed squarely at the criminal facilitator whose ‘business plan’ for operating a 
rogue online pharmacy is to recruit an unscrupulous practitioner to write prescriptions…’”
166  
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However, the broad language of the provision would on its face apply to all Internet 
intermediaries.  Therefore, the RHA tailors the provision by exempting (1) mere advocacy or 
pricing information without an offer to sell, (2) Internet access services
167 and Internet 
information location tools,
168 unless they “act in concert” with rogue pharmacy operators, and (3) 
mere indiscriminate and unfiltered handling of communication.
169   
These exceptions for Internet access services and information location tools (comprising the vast 
majority of Internet intermediaries, and possibly all of them), swallow the rule, all but requiring 
that the government show that an intermediary “acted in concert” with a rogue online pharmacy.  
In its regulation, the DEA proposes only one way to prove that a person “acted in concert” with 
the violator of the RHA – proving that the accomplice conspired to violate the RHA
170 or “aided 
and abetted such violation.”
171  The interwoven World Wide Web serves as a fertile ground for 
debate on the degree of “abetting” that intermediaries exercise when providing their services.  
Without further guidance or regulatory language, the government will have to prove with each 
type of intermediary that the intermediary “acted in concert” with the violator of the RHA. 
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“Aiding and abetting” in the context of the CSA is a high bar for prosecution and conviction.  A 
2009 Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Lovern,
172 illustrates the application of the “aiding and 
abetting” standard in 21 U.S.C. § 841(h)(1)(B).  In Lovern, the DEA prosecuted the operators of 
two rogue online pharmacies, based on their direct violation of the CSA.
173  The main issue for 
the Tenth Circuit concerned the sufficiency of evidence to convict two employees (a pharmacist 
and a computer technician) working for the website operators, on charges of conspiracy to 
violate the CSA as well as aiding and abetting under § 841(h)(1)(B).
174  The employees’ 
culpability hinged on whether they “knew the prescriptions they helped fill at [the rogue 
pharmacy] were issued by [third-party] physicians acting outside the usual course of professional 
medical practice or with a legitimate medical purpose.”
175   
The court first drew a distinction between the employees’ involvement and experience: the 
pharmacist, Lovern, possessed over 40 years of pharmacy experience and worked closely with 
the operators; whereas the computer technician, Barron, was a high school drop-out without any 
experience in the pharmaceutical industry, and without a similar level of involvement in the 
business.
176  In applying the standard to Barron, the court found that the following evidence fell 
short of the standard for conviction: (1) Barron sent a text message to a business affiliate stating, 
“[h]ook a brother up on scripts. I need some fake customers please. Mahahahaha;”
177 (2) Barron 
never registered with the state board of pharmacy, despite being told to do so by a state 
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employee;
178 and (3) Barron sent an instant message to a business affiliate stating that a certain 
prescription for longer than 30 days was “very illegal,” but only after the pharmacy has been 
cited for issuing long-term drug amounts.
179  According to the court, the evidence sufficed for 
the inference that Barron knew that the pharmacy was unlawfully accepting prescriptions on the 
Internet,
180 but not that Barron knew that the contracted physicians issued prescriptions outside 
the usual course of professional practice or without a legitimate medical purpose.
181  Because a 
“general suspicion that an unlawful act may occur or that something criminal is happening is not 
enough” to convict a defendant under § 841(h)(1)(B), the court reversed Barron’s conviction.
182   
Lovern’s standard for “aiding and abetting” under the CSA demonstrates the elements of proof 
that the DEA has to provide when prosecuting an intermediary under the RHA.  At a minimum, 
the DEA has to show that the intermediary knows that the operator of an online pharmacy 
accepts business from the U.S., and knows either (1) that the pharmacy issues online 
prescriptions unlawfully, or (2) that the prescriptions are issued by doctors acting outside the 
usual course of medical practice.  Because most Internet intermediaries provide neutral services 
(e.g. payment processing, publishing of content, domain registration), the nature of the business 
websites utilizing intermediaries is rarely documented or discussed in detail, leaving prosecutors 
no paper-trail to hold on to except when the prosecutors notify the intermediary.  Moreover, 
screening rogue online pharmacies is challenging, as they are sometimes indistinguishable from 
legal online pharmacies.  As a result, among Internet intermediaries, the intermediary exception 
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of the RHA is aimed at non-mainstream websites, which knowingly facilitate traffic toward 
rogue online pharmacies.  One such example is the portal sites that serve to link search engine 
users to sale sites and Internet pharmacies.
183  
The RHA imposes a higher standard on one class of intermediaries—online advertisers of rogue 
pharmacies
184—making it unlawful “to knowingly or intentionally use the Internet [. . .] to 
advertise the sale of [a controlled substance]” except as authorized by the CSA,
185 including 
placing an Internet advertisement “that directs prospective buyers to Internet sellers of controlled 
substances who are not registered with [an online pharmacy] modification [. . .].”
186  Unlike with 
the other intermediaries, the prosecution of online advertisers does not require proof that the 
online advertiser aided a rogue pharmacy, but merely that the advertiser knew about the rogue 
pharmacies’ use of its services.
187  The RHA also makes it unlawful to advertise websites whose 
activities violate the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act.
188  The prohibition covers 
websites that advertise the importation of controlled substances for “personal use.”
189 
Although probably less demanding than the prosecution of intermediaries acting in concert with 
rogue pharmacy operators, the prosecution of advertisers requires evidence that the advertising 
websites put up the advertisements “knowingly or intentionally.”  The DEA adopted the 
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interpretation of the Eighth
190 and Fourth
191 Circuits in concluding that “a practitioner may be 
convicted of knowingly or intentionally dispensing controlled substances in violation of the CSA 
where the practitioner either (i) had actual knowledge of the illegal activity or (ii) was presented 
with facts that put him on notice that criminal activity was particularly likely and yet 
intentionally failed to investigate those facts.”
192  A similar standard applies to pharmacists,
193 
and thus probably online advertisers.  Whatever the exact scope, the problem of proof can be 
resolved by the DEA by notifying the advertiser that one or more of its business clients violate 
the CSA.   
There are several reasons to impose a higher duty of care on online.
194  Online advertising 
services are effective at channeling traffic to rogue pharmacies; advertisers profit from the 
advertising activity; and advertisers have an established poor record in filtering out rogue 
pharmacies both from search results and from submitted ads.
195  While prosecutors relied on the 
FDCA in the recent investigation of Google’s AdWords practices, the RHA’s advertiser 
provision is a viable option as well for similar prosecutions.  The RHA allows criminal 
prosecution, as does the FDCA, and even sets a lower proof standard.  There are three possible 
explanations regarding the preference of the DOJ to build the investigation on the FDCA 
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provisions: first, it is likely that the investigation of Google began before the passage of the 
RHA;
196 second, the prosecutors may have intended to capture ads from online pharmacies that 
sell prescription drugs not classified as controlled substances; and third, on the federal side, the 
investigation was conducted by the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, and not the DEA. 
In sum, the RHA allows the DEA to prosecute websites that focus on illegal activity, but not the 
mainstream intermediaries that serve as traffic highways online.  
d.  Effects of the RHA 
According to some DEA officials, the RHA has eliminated U.S.-based rogue online 
pharmacies.
197  (About 50% of online pharmacies are hosted in the U.S.,
198 and only 24% of the 
drugs sold online are shipped from the U.S..
199)  It appears that the DEA has accordingly reduced 
the resources devoted to the problem, relying on the deterring effect of the new legislation.
200  
Indeed, in an October 2010 conference, the DEA’s pharmaceutical investigation chief has 
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downplayed the problem as manageable in the aftermath of the RHA.
201  Outside the DEA’s 
statements, there is little published evidence that the RHA succeeded in curbing the growth of 
rogue online pharmacies.  Moreover, the studies that analyzed the post-RHA Internet pharmacy 
industry did not confirm DEA’s optimism.
202  The best indicator of the total effect would be 
gauging the volume of illegal controlled substance sales via the Internet.  Since measuring the 
volume of black markets is difficult, researchers can also approximate the effect by analyzing the 
changes in availability of drugs from online pharmacies and the DEA’s success in enforcing the 
RHA to shut down websites.  
A 2009 study assessed the online availability of seventeen popular drugs between 2007 and 
2009, and found that “a growing number of online pharmacies have abandoned the basic 
requirement of a valid prescription.”
203  During the two years of the study, the number of online 
pharmacies that do not require a prescription or only require an online consultation grew by 
65%.
204  Alarmingly, the study showed that the counterfeit drug pipeline does not show signs of 
drying up: the study revealed a 30% increase in the number of listings offering bulk 
pharmaceuticals and active ingredients across multiple popular business-to-business trade 
boards.
205  The results indicate that even if fewer rogue Internet pharmacies operate from the 
U.S., the supply and availability of counterfeit drugs remains.  
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Another study, conducted by an online pharmacy watchdog organization LegitScript, looked at 
the DEA’s efforts to enforce the RHA.
206  The researchers in the study listed a 1,000 rogue 
Internet pharmacies, more than half of which are located in the U.S. to demonstrate that the RHA 
did not eliminate the problem of illegal online sales of controlled substances.  The study 
investigates several rogue pharmacies’ registration information, revealing that a large number of 
them are almost certainly run from the U.S.
207  The researchers argue that the DEA should take 
action against rogue pharmacies that depend entirely on U.S. domain name registrars, servers, 
and delivery services.  The study also uncovers some of the techniques used by rogue pharmacy 
operators to avoid prosecution, such as creating several versions of the website that alternate 
based on the link that brings the user to the rogue pharmacy.  The researchers conclude that the 
DEA has far from accomplished its mission to minimize the illegal sales of controlled substances 
online.
208   
The contrast between the studies and the DEA’s views highlights the need for additional research 
on the online market for pharmaceuticals.  Additionally, the DEA’s views may simply reflect the 
agency’s priorities rather than a perceived success in blocking illicit online drug sales.  
e.  Where the RHA falls short 
The RHA provides new authority for the DEA, but also falls short in at least two areas: foreign 
Internet pharmacies and prescription drugs not classified as controlled substances.  
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i.  Foreign Internet pharmacies 
The RHA allows the DEA to target domestic questionnaire pharmacies more effectively, but 
there is little in the RHA’s language to address ‘pill mills’ abroad, which comprise about 50% of 
all rogue online pharmacies.  In the age of global e-commerce, enforcement alone cannot stop 
the proliferation of foreign rogue online pharmacies.
209 Even with perfect cooperation from other 
countries, the online sale of the prescription drugs often occurs in nations that do not prohibit 
such sales themselves.  As a result, while the DEA celebrates the success of the RHA, the new 
Act is limited to only half the black market at the outset.  
When the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary solicited advice on regulating online 
pharmacies, the global character of the problem was raised by Professor Philip Heymann, who 
suggested a regulation scheme to reach both questionnaire pharmacies domestically and 
anonymous “pill mills” around the globe by imposing new requirements on Internet search 
engines and payment intermediaries.
210  Professor Heymann’s testimony was based on his work 
with “Keep Internet Neighborhoods Safe” (KINS), a collaboration of the Center for International 
Criminal Justice at Harvard Law School, Drug Strategies, the Treatment Research Institute at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and the Weill Medical Center at Cornell University.  The group held 
several meetings and a major conference to discuss the regulatory options in protecting youth 
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from the availability of addictive drugs online.  KINS meetings participants included 
representatives of all the major stakeholders and government offices: internet service providers, 
search engines, banks, credit card companies, private carriers, the National Institute of Drug 
Abuse, DOJ, DEA, the Department of State, and staff members from key Senate and House 
Committees.   
In his testimony, Professor Heymann reintroduced KINS’s key published recommendations, 
urging the Committee to complement the direct regulation of rogue websites with the regulation 
of Internet intermediaries.  The logic of this argument is firm: e-commerce websites depend on 
the cooperation of search engines to be found, payment intermediaries to be paid online, shipping 
couriers to deliver their products, Internet service providers to be accessed, and domain name 
registrants to own a website name.  Specifically, under KINS’s recommendations, (1) ISPs 
should offer a “parental control” filtering service for customers, (2) payment intermediaries must 
test, and if necessary, shut down, any merchants that are reported as illegal by DOJ, and (3) 
search engines should display a prominent banner “that reminds the requestor that it is illegal to 
buy or sell this drug in the United States without a prescription” whenever a user enters certain 
terms.
211 To update the Internet intermediaries’ databases of alleged offenders and related search 
terms, KINS recommended the creation of an independent monitoring group, a small non-profit 
comprising “a group of individuals simply using search engines to identify websites offering to 
sell controlled substances without valid prescriptions.” The independent monitoring group would 
combine the investigative information that is currently dispersed among the agencies.   
Despite the potential effectiveness of KINS’s recommendations, the Committee rejected the 
broader regulatory approach because “[w]hile leading credit card companies and Internet service 
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providers did express general support for many of the plenary group’s ideas, their preference was 
for encouraging voluntary compliance rather than legislative or regulatory mandates.”
212  The 
Committee curtailed the RHA’s intermediary liability provisions to the “aid and abet” standard 
discussed supra, allowing the major intermediaries to self-regulate.  
ii.  Prescription drugs not classified as controlled substances 
Another notable limitation of the RHA is that the Act addresses only the sales of controlled 
substances rather than the sales of all prescription medicine.  According to the DEA, “[a] 
controlled substance is placed in its respective schedule based on whether it has a currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States and its relative abuse potential and 
likelihood of causing dependence.”
213  The “safest” controlled substances, those classified as 
Schedule IV or V, have some potential for abuse.
214  On the other hand, the need for a 
prescription is determined by the FDA when the agency evaluates a drug’s safety.
215  By limiting 
the RHA to controlled substances, the authors of the RHA ignored the risk of self-medicating 
with prescription drugs not classified as controlled substances.  
In 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1), the FDCA enumerates two situations in which a drug may be limited to 
a prescription-only status: (A) a drug which “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for 
harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe 
                                                 
212 Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2007, Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, September 17, 2008. Rep. 110-521, 110th Congress, 2d Session.  
213 Drug Enforcement Agency, Office of Diversion, Controlled Substance Schedules, November 2011,  
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/index.html. 
214 Id.  
215 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355.  The authority of the agency to determine the prescription status of a 
drug was affirmed in Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975). 52 
 
for use except [by prescription];”
216 and (B) a drug which is limited to prescription status in the 
new drug approval process.
217  The FDA relies on 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) to limit virtually all 
new chemical entity drugs to prescription-only status. Drug manufacturers may apply for an 
over-the-counter (OTC) status after at least five years of marketing, during which the agency 
evaluates the safety of the drug and the potential effects of self-medication.
218   
The second situation, described in § 353(b)(1)(A), consists of three factors: toxicity, potentiality 
for harmful effect, and the method of use or collateral measures necessary to use.  Toxicity 
encompasses the risk posed by incorrectly titrating the drug, but does not extend to all misuse.
219  
Other potentiality for harmful effect refers to a broader set of considerations related to ingesting 
the drug, including potential for abuse and the potential for tampering.
220  Finally, the last factor, 
methods of use and collateral measures necessary, encompasses the risks of all possible 
circumstances under which a drug is used, including policy and enforcement considerations.
221  
                                                 
216 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A).  
217 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B).  
218 See Peter B. Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, Lewis A. Grossman, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, Ch. 4(i) 
(3rd ed. 2007). 
219 See United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "-Decholin-", 264 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Mich. 1967). 
220 See Peter B. Hutt, “A Legal Framework for future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from Prescription to 
Nonprescription Status,” Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 37, No. 427 (1982).  
221 For an example of a broad interpretation see United States v. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556 
(W.D.N.Y. 1986) (Accepts the FDA’s reasoning that mega-doses of vitamins A and D should require prescription 
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Although the FDA’s prescription status determination was seriously questioned in an early 
case,
222 the last case on the question indicated a deferral to the FDA’s judgment.
223   
A Kansas case demonstrates how the illegal online sale of prescription drugs not classified as 
controlled substances presents a less favorable prosecution fact-pattern.  In State ex rel. Stovall v. 
ConfiMed.com, L.L.C.,
224  the Kansas Attorney General sued a physician that issued online 
prescriptions for Kansas residents through an online out-of-state pharmacy.  The court concluded 
that the physician did not violate Kansas’ consumer protection law
225 when he failed to perform 
a physical examination and sold Viagra, a prescription drug, to a minor.  Notably, the trial court 
highlighted that “there was no actual harm done to anyone[,] [n]othing was misrepresented[, and 
a]ll drugs furnished were authentic.”
226  These factors are significant in evaluating the violation 
of a consumer protection law, leading the court to the correct decision.  Indeed, in the states that 
have not yet banned online prescription, neither state nor federal regulators have authority to 
discipline a physician working with a rogue online pharmacy, unless the pharmacy misrepresents 
its products, imports drugs from abroad, or sells adulterated or misbranded drugs.   
It is possible to reconcile the RHA’s limitation to controlled substances with the FDA’s finding 
that many drugs not classified as controlled substances are unsafe for self-medication.  As often 
                                                 
222 United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "-Decholin-", 264 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (The court evaluated 
the FDA’s evidence on the questions of toxicity and collateral measures, dismissing the case with prejudice to the 
FDA.) 
223 United States v. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (Applies a deferential “arbitrary or 
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224 38 P.3d 707 (2002).  
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is the case with major laws regulating food and drug, the passage of the RHA was carried on a 
wave of visible problem, namely, the death of a young man who purchased oxycotin online.
227  
The call for action was amplified by the reports of increased pharmaceutical drug abuse,
228 
without a similar amplification for drugs not classified as controlled substances.
229  The resulting 
legislation is best viewed as a reflection of priorities in a reactionary legislative environment.  
Although legislators have proposed bills creating RHA-style requirements for drugs not 
classified as controlled substances,
230 the efforts are unlikely to succeed without the same 
catalyst and movement that carried the RHA through the legislation process.  
As discussed infra, since the passage of the RHA Congress has considered legislation to expand 
the regulation to both foreign-based websites and to prescription drugs not classified as 
controlled substances.  
                                                 
227 For more background see Reaching Youth Abusing Narcotics at http://www. Ryanscause.org. 
228 Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2007, Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, September 17, 2008. Rep. 110-521, 110th Congress, 2d Session. 
229 The FDA’s earlier testimony on Internet drug sales cited high violation rates, but could not match the DEA in 
citing confirmed adverse effects. See Internet Drug Sales: Hearings before the H.R. Committee on Government 
Reform, 104th Congress. (2004) (Statement of William K. Hubbard, Associate FDA Commissioner for Policy and 
Planning) 
230 See e.g. Online Pharmacy Safety Act of 2011, Senate Bill S. 2002, 112th Congress (2011). Text available at 
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5) RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
a.  Legislation aimed at counterfeit drugs 
Two years after the passage of the RHA, Committee Chairman Leahy introduced legislation to 
regulate Internet intermediaries, this time as a means to shut down websites that share 
copyrighted materials illegally. The bill, titled Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits 
Act (“COICA”), would authorize the U.S. Attorney General to commence an action in rem 
against a domain name used by an Internet site that is “dedicated to infringing activities,” even if 
the domain name is located outside of the U.S.
231 Following the commencement of an action, the 
court would be authorized to serve any ISPs, financial transaction providers, and Internet 
advertising services to take “technically feasible” or other specified reasonable measures to 
prevent infringing activities from continuing. The COICA’s definition of an Internet site 
“dedicated to infringing activities” included any website, domestic or foreign, that is “primarily 
designed […] to sell or offer to sell or distribute or otherwise promote goods, services, or 
materials bearing a counterfeit mark […], and […] such activities are the central activities of the 
Internet site.”
232 Both domestic and foreign online pharmacies that sell counterfeit medicine 
would fall under the definition. The COICA also would grant immunity to Internet 
intermediaries acting pursuant to a court order, as well as to Internet intermediaries voluntarily 
declining service to domain names that the intermediaries believe are dedicated to infringing 
activities.
233 To mitigate the broad approach of the bill, the COICA would require the court to 
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ensure that a foreign website alleged to be “dedicated to infringing activities” has sufficient ties 
to the U.S.
234 
The COICA generated wide opposition from the Internet community, privacy advocates, and 
technology companies. Dozens of law professors from all over the world expressed their 
objections to the bill in a formal letter to the Committee.
235 The group asserted that the bill (1) 
abridged freedom of speech by allowing to shut down websites without an opportunity to object, 
(2) suppressed protected speech containing no infringing content by requiring the closure of 
subdomains,  and (3) introduces censorship. In the end, what fifty one law professors could not 
achieve with a legal argument, one senator accomplished using the arcane
236 Senate rules. After 
passing through the Committee on the Judiciary with flying colors, the COICA was put “on 
hold” and thus killed by Senator Wyden, on the belief that the “COICA’s at-all-costs approach to 
protecting intellectual property would have inflicted collateral damage on the foundations of the 
                                                 
234 COICA would allow to bring action against foreign domains if (1) such a domain is used within the United States 
to access an infringing site; (2) the site directs business to U.S. residents; and (3) the site harms U.S. intellectual 
property rights holders. (§ 2(d)(2)(A)). In determining whether a site directs business to U.S. residents, COICA 
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235 Law Professors’ Letter in Opposition to S. 3804, November 16, 2010, available at 
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236 See e.g. The New Yorker, The Empty Chamber, August 9, 2010, available at 
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Internet, trampled free speech, stifled innovation and given license to foreign regimes to further 
censor the Internet for political and commercial purposes.”
237  
The COICA was resurrected in a revised form in May 2011, when Senator Leahy introduced the 
“Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
of 2011” (PIPA).
238, 
239 The new legislation shifted focus to nondomestic domain names only, 
and added online search engines (covered by the term “information location tool”) to the list of 
affected Internet intermediaries. In its most relevant part, the PIPA introduces a new section to 
address rogue pharmacies that do not require a valid prescription when selling prescription 
drugs.
240 The section is less burdensome on Internet intermediaries, addressing only their 
voluntary actions. Specifically, it provides immunity from liability to any Internet 
intermediary
241 that stops providing services to a site that it believes “endangers the public 
health.”
242  Under the Act, an ‘infringing Internet site that endangers the public health” includes 
“an Internet site that is […] operated […] primarily as a means for offering, selling, dispensing, 
                                                 
237 Press Release, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, Senator Wyden Response to the PROTECT IP Act Introduction (May 
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Bill S. 968, 112th Congress (2011).  
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or distributing any controlled or non-controlled prescription medication, and does so regularly 
without a valid prescription[,] or […] for medication that is adulterated or misbranded.”
243  
The PIPA thus creates two new regulatory approaches to regulating rogue online pharmacies 
based abroad. First, if the U.S. Attorney General determines that a foreign site is dedicated to 
selling counterfeit drugs, she may commence a legal action, and the court may order Internet 
intermediaries to deny service to the rogue pharmacy. Second, if an Internet intermediary denies 
service to a website it considers a rogue online pharmacy, the intermediary is immune from a 
lawsuit. The immunity is granted regardless of the location of the domain name (domestic or 
abroad), the authenticity of the drugs (counterfeit or not), and the website’s market (whether the 
pharmacy deals with U.S. residents or not). Therefore, what the immunity provisions hold back 
in regulatory requirements, they make up for in the breadth of their reach. Presumably, Congress 
would not so arm the private entities that service rogue pharmacies unless it expected them to use 
the newly granted powers. By protecting the Internet intermediaries in dealing with rogue online 
pharmacies, the legislation inadvertently applies pressure on the intermediaries to cooperate with 
the agencies seeking to shut down such pharmacies. 
i.  Intermediary provisions and their potential effects 
The PIPA incorporated elements of Professor Heymann’s advice, with separate regulatory 
provisions for different types of Internet intermediaries.  Each of the provisions is likely to have 
both positive and negative consequences. 
The PIPA requires financial transaction providers to “take reasonable measures, as expeditiously 
as reasonable, designed to prevent, prohibit, or suspend its service from completing payment 
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transactions involving customers located within the United States and the Internet site.”
244  As 
policymakers learned from regulating online gambling, the regulation of payment intermediaries 
can be effective against infringing websites, but is also prone to adverse consequences.  
Specifically, the void left by the major payment processors may be filled by off-shore payment 
intermediaries, specializing in avoiding U.S. law.
245, 
246  The trend was evident in the passage of 
the RHA as well, which was marked by an increase in online pharmacies that do not require a 
prescription compared to online pharmacies that do.
247   
The PIPA also mandates the operators of non-authoritative domain name servers (“DNS”)
248 to 
“take the least burdensome technically feasible and reasonable measures designed to prevent the 
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245 For a discussion on the payment intermediary cottage industry following the passage of the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Act of 2006, see Ian Abovitz, Why the United States Should Rethink Its Legal Approach to Internet 
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domain name described in the order from resolving to that domain name’s Internet protocol 
address.” These “reasonable measures” do not include the modification of the DNS operator’s 
network, software, system, or facilities.
249 The function of each of the ten million non-
authoritative DNS servers is to direct users who enter domain names, such as 
‘www.accessrx.com,’ to the websites’ respective IP addresses, such as ‘173.223.22.116.’
250 
Unlike authoritative DNS operators, which provide the information based on their records, non-
authoritative DNS operators redirect users based on a cache file that contains the results of 
previous contacts with authoritative servers.
251 Under a PIPA court order, a non-authoritative 
DNS server operator would have to redirect the user to a textual notice instead of the correct IP 
address. The website will remain at its IP address, but the user would not be able to reach the 
website by entering the familiar domain name.  
Although the U.S. has never filtered DNS traffic, the experience of China and other countries has 
shown several dangerous drawbacks to DNS filtering. Besides standing in tension with existing 
Internet security measures, DNS filtering may easily be circumvented using user-friendly tools. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the DNS faster and less expensive to operate, over ten million so-called “recursive servers” exist as accelerators of 
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end users to resolve DNS names in order to access content on the Internet.” Steve Crocker, David Dagon, Dan 
Kaminsky, Danny McPherson, and Paul Vixie, Security and Other Technical Concerns Raised by the DNS Filtering 
Requirements in the PROTECT IP Bill, May 2011, at http://s3.amazonaws.com/dmk/PROTECT-IP-Technical-
Whitepaper-Final.pdf. 
249 PIPA § 3(d)(2)(A). 
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Once circumvented the policy may compromise Internet safety. Worse yet, the website itself 
may change the DNS settings on the user’s computer with or without the user’s knowledge. Once 
the user’s settings are changed to contact a foreign DNS server to look up IPs, it becomes prone 
to misdirection when trying to access other websites as well.
252 
PIPA further requires Internet advertising services, upon a court order, to “take technically 
feasible and reasonable measures, as expeditiously as reasonable,” to prevent its service from 
providing advertisements to the website, and to cease making available advertisements, links, or 
any other access points to the domain name.”
253 In addition to the advertising services’ current 
duty to act when notified of advertising by rogue pharmacies,
254 the Act requires the advertising 
services to deny service to alleged counterfeit-drugs pharmacies upon a court order. For 
counterfeit-drug pharmacies, the change in the law is minor. Advertising services “use the 
Internet” to “advertise the [unauthorized] sale of […] controlled substances.
255 Knowledge of 
illegal activity by their customers is the only remaining legal factor to hold the advertising 
networks criminally liable under CSA.
256 Currently, DOJ may rely on academic articles and 
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reports to establish the advertising service’s knowledge of the activity;
257 whereas under PIPA, 
the court order serves to establish that knowledge.   
The proposed requirement for advertising systems is feasible, and would not cause adverse 
consequences. Combined, the RHA and the PIPA would require advertising services both to 
maintain reasonable safeguards to prevent advertising of rogue pharmacies and to remove any 
advertising by counterfeit-drug pharmacies when served by a U.S. court. Modern advertising 
services, such as Google’s AdWords and Microsoft’s adCenter, are experts at collecting and 
analyzing information on the Internet, and will be able to comply with court orders under both 
Acts.  Moreover, for the major advertisers, compliance would require no more than a stricter 
adherence to the advertising services’ own policies. Without the regulation, advertising services 
have incentive to profit at the expense of their customers’ safety, which may be the reason the 
advertising services have been slow to comply. There is no third-party offshore alternative when 
it comes to advertising on the popular advertising networks, although rogue pharmacies may 
continue to advertise on websites of lower reputation. Once rogue pharmacies have only 
temporary access to the major advertising services before having their ads removed, the 
pharmacies are likely to intensify their focus on the other main method of attracting new Internet 
customers: search engine optimization.
258  
To prevent search-generated traffic to counterfeit-drugs pharmacies for confused and aware users 
alike, the PIPA requires search engines to “take technically feasible and reasonable measures, as 
expeditiously as possible, to remove or disable access to Internet site […] or not serve a 
                                                 
257 
257 The Wall Street Journal, Google Was Warned on Rogue Drug Ads, May 21, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704083904576335483063623402.html. 
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hypertext link to such Internet site.”
259 Upon a court order, search engines would be required to 
manually remove certain listings from their databases, probably without an explanation to the 
search engine user. Google has manipulated its search before to accommodate the Chinese 
government by eliminating search results for certain keywords,
260 but this policy would require 
the removal of the domain name from the search results globally.  
Many Internet commentators, including Google’s Chairman, find the manipulation of search 
results a dangerous precedent to free speech online.
261  Moreover, search engine rankings have 
been granted First Amendment protection against a claim of tortuous interference with contract 
in Search King Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.
262  In Search King, a U.S. District judge found 
Google’s website rankings to be an opinion because its results are Google’s subjective view of 
the relevance of websites to the query, even if the algorithm itself is objective and automated. 
However, as the influence of Internet intermediaries continued to grow, several commentators 
presented cases against a laissez faire regulatory approach to page rankings.
263 Since the U.S. is 
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yet to regulate Internet search results, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the search engine 
intermediary provision. 
ii.  The PIPA’s fate 
The PIPA was introduced with an auspicious bipartisan support.  When the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on the legislation, twelve of the seventeen Committee members, 
appeared as co-sponsors of the bill, ultimately granting the legislation unanimous approval.
 264  
By November 2011, in preparations for the Senate floor vote, the PIPA enjoyed an enviable 
sponsor list of 40 Senators from both political parties.  The Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) did not shy away from taking credit for goading much of the political 
support.
265  But the closer the PIPA moved to passing, the more controversy the Act generated in 
the Internet community.
266  By January, the PIPA generated a firestorm on the Internet, which 
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eventually killed the support for the bill overnight.
267  The specific night was January 18, 2012, 
when major websites, such as Wikipedia and Reddit, “blacked out” for 24 hours in protest.
268  
The Internet community’s opposition to the PIPA is best summarized by Wikipedia: 
 
SOPA  and  PIPA  would  put  the  burden  on  website  owners  to  police  user-
contributed material and call for the unnecessary blocking of entire sites. Small 
sites won't have sufficient resources to defend themselves. Big media companies 
may  seek  to  cut  off  funding  sources  for  their  foreign  competitors,  even  if 
copyright  isn't  being  infringed.  Some  foreign  sites  would  be  prevented  from 
showing up in major search engines. And, SOPA and PIPA build a framework for 
future restrictions and suppression.
269 
 
Since then, even Chris Dodd, the main lobbyist for the RIAA, admitted that the PIPA is 
“dead.”
270  But the PIPA’s death did not halt Congress’s efforts to regulate Internet 
intermediaries to combat rogue online pharmacies.    
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b.  Legislation aimed at other prescription drugs online  
The Online Pharmacy Safety Act
271 (OPSA), currently under consideration in the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, addresses the online sales of prescription drugs not 
classified as controlled substances.  The Act is narrower than the RHA, creating only two new 
requirements: (1) an in-person examination requirement for a valid prescription,
272 and (2) a 
registration requirement for all online pharmacies in a government registry.
273  Once the OPSA 
registry is created, the Act directs the dissemination of the “legitimate pharmacies” registry to 
the public and all Internet intermediaries.
274  Borrowing from the PIPA’s online pharmacy 
provisions, the OPSA then grants immunity to those intermediaries who refuse service to online 
pharmacies that are not listed by the registry.
275 
Although the OPSA does not enjoy RIAA’s lobbying dollars, neither is the legislation likely to 
meet the public opposition that derailed the PIPA’s course.  The immunity provisions of the 
PIPA, aimed at rogue online pharmacies only, never surfaced in the public debates about the 
PIPA, indicating a lower public interest in the issue.  The OPSA is co-sponsored by four 
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safety.”  
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Senators so far.  Depending on the impact left by the failure of the PIPA, the legislation may gain 
bipartisan support as it progresses through the chambers.   
As for the effect of the OPSA in regulating online pharmacies, the legislation is likely to aid the 
FDA significantly based on the same considerations that fueled the PIPA’s immunity provisions 
– immunity implies obligations for the intermediaries, and thus effective federal oversight of the 
intermediaries’ online pharmacy clients.  Once the FDA establishes a “legal online pharmacy” 
registry, the burden shifts to the intermediaries to justify any online pharmacy clients who are not 
legally registered.  By passing the burden to online pharmacies to register and to the Internet 
intermediaries to limit clients to registered pharmacies, the OPSA establishes the FDA as the 
regulator and the intermediaries as the enforcers of the new scheme, thus facilitating resource-
efficient oversight.   
c.  New state laws that supplement federal law 
The active legislation drafting on part of the U.S. Congress did not stop the states from reaching 
online pharmacies through evolving state laws applicable to all pharmacies.  Whereas federal 
efforts track the illegal drug sales by following the sources of drugs, states often tackle the 
activity from the opposite end – by investigating cases of drug abuse.   
One of the most aggressive states on the issue has been Kentucky, where House Speaker and 
former State Attorney General Greg Stumbo has battled rogue online pharmacies and substance 
abuse for years.  For several years, the state has employed the Kentucky All Schedule 
Prescription Electronic Reporting (KASPER) system to track controlled substance prescriptions 
dispensed within the state, compiling a report by recipients, prescribers, and dispensers.
276  The 
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report is available to certain medical professionals and to some state authorities.
277  In April 
2012, the Kentucky House of Representatives passed a House Bill 1, which tightens the 
regulation of controlled substances.
 278  The bill’s provisions include moving KASPER to the 
Attorney General’s office, requiring all physicians who prescribe controlled substances to 
register with the attorney general, providing local authorities additional enforcement powers to 
track down diversion of controlled substances, requiring the Medicaid authority to track 
KASPER records, and increasing overall penalties for offenses involving controlled 
substances.
279  The law would establish an unprecedented, uniquely far-reaching enforcement 
system for controlled substances.   
While states cannot handle the problem of rogue pharmacies on their own, the states’ direct 
contact with the recipients of drugs plays an important role in the ongoing monitoring of rogue 
pharmacy activity in general, and the trafficking of controlled substances in particular.  The 
proposed federal legislation may benefit from allocating some funding to similar state programs 
to share intelligence with the federal agencies.  
 
6) CONCLUSION 
 
In the efforts to mitigate the growth of rogue Internet pharmacies, each actor—states, federal 
agencies, private intermediaries, and trade organizations—has proven effective in its realm, but 
                                                 
277 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.202(6). 
278 An Act Relating to Controlled Substances and Making an Appropriation Therefor, House Bill 1, Kentucky 2012 
Extraordinary Session, available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/12SS/HB1.htm. 
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inadequate to stop the overall trend.  As policymakers and private companies continue to develop 
solutions to the Internet-based illegal drug sales, innovation and cooperation hold promise for 
success. The OSPA provides an example of a potent semi-voluntary engagement of Internet 
intermediaries.  Kentucky serves as a pioneer in relying on the resources of the state to stop the 
demand for controlled substances.  Visa, MasterCard, YouTube, and Craigslist, are all examples 
of quick notification-response procedures.  Just as the rogue pharmacies rely on a network of 
intermediaries and suppliers to sell drugs illegally to U.S. residents, legitimate businesses and 
regulators are relying on each other to set up a powerful system of oversight.  